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Remedies in American Courts
by Peter Herzberg*
There is always an advantage and a disadvantage to speaking toward
the end of the program. The disadvantage is that everything you wanted
to say has been said already. The advantage is that you can add some
perspective to what went on before you.
I'd like to tell you a story that might be reflective of what we have
seen here today, when economists, scientists and lawyers are gathered
together.
A company president who wanted to hire an assistant put an ad in
the paper, to which people responded. The first person the president interviewed was an economist. He asked the economist, "How much is two
and two?"
The economist answered, "Before taxes or after taxes?"
The company president threw him out of the office.
The second person who came into the company president's office was
a scientist. He asked the scientist, "How much is two and two?"
The scientist said, "How much is my margin of error?"
The company president threw him out of the office.
The third person who walked in was a lawyer. He asked the lawyer,
"How much is two and two?"
The lawyer got a little nervous and looked uncomfortable. Seeing
that the door to the company president's office was open, he went to the
door, shut the door, went back to his seat and leaned over the desk to the
company president and said, "How much do you want it to be?" in answering the problems posed in the program.
That's how I feel about the way things are today. The various interest groups and the lawyers who have represented their interests have
said, "How much do you want it to be?"
Before I begin my address, I'd like to make a disclaimer. The opinions expressed in my address are my personal views. They do not in any
way reflect the views of the Attorney General's Office in New Jersey or
the Department of Environmental Protection in New Jersey. So, with
that in mind, let me begin.
The view of the landscape when flying into Cleveland is one of the
few sights in the world that can give a superiority complex to a person
from Trenton, New Jersey. In Cleveland, factory stacks belch clouds of
smoke and emit acrid smells. In New Jersey, we have only the acrid
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smells. But, slander aside, due to the long-range transport of pollution by
meteorological conditions, the view flying into Cleveland vividly brings
home the point that Ohio's air pollution problems are also New Jersey's
air pollution problems; Ohio's sulphuric dioxide is New Jersey's sulphuric
hydroxide.
The question is how to equitably apportion responsibility for solving
the pollution problems caused by the long-range transport of pollutants.
One way to answer this question is through litigation, another is through
legislation. My topic today is litigation theories which may be used to
solve problems caused by the long-range transport of pollutants. My conclusion is that presently available litigation theories are not an effective
mechanism for solving the long-range transport problem, and that little
hope should be placed on such judicially imposed solutions. Rather, I find
that legislation provides the only effective means for solving the longrange transport problem. Legislative will, not judicial mandate, is what
must be pursued.
The essence of the long-range transport of pollutants is that emissions from a source or group of sources do not have an immediate impact
within the state in which the pollutants are emitted, but rather impact
downwind in areas under the jurisdiction of other states. Thus, the obvious target of any litigation strategy is to compel emitting sources in the
upwind states to control their pollution from traveling downwind. One
such potential litigation theory is the common law of interstate nuisance.
The common law in the U.S. legal system is a set of general principles, which evolved in the courts over the centuries, for finding appropriate resolutions to situations that bring people in our society into conflict.
Not surprisingly, a body of common law has developed regarding the
regulation of nuisances. For instance, courts have been called upon to intervene and regulate situations such as an explosion set on one property
which throws rocks onto other properties or where odors from a
slaughterhouse invade a neighboring residential area.
However, it was not until 1972, and it took no less an environmentalist than Justice Douglas, to confirm the existence of a Federal common
law of interstate nuisance in the United States. This occurred in the case
of Illinois v. Milwaukee, in which the State of fllinois sought to restrict
Milwaukee's dumping of raw sewage into Lake Michigan. Wishing to restrict such sewage dumping, but having no Federal legislation on which to
rationalize its decision, the Supreme Court confirmed the right of a State
to sue a polluting source in another State on the theory of the common
law of interstate nuisance.
While the availability of a common law theory is present to abate an
interstate nuisance, substantive problems exist which frequently render
the application of the common law theory virtually useless. For instance,
a State must show that specific actions of an identified polluter are causing an actual injury. In the early case of Missouri v. Illinois (1906), which
typifies the problems of isolating causation, the Supreme Court failed to
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find fault, thus barring any remedy. In that case, Missouri tried to prove
that certain pollution in the Mississippi River around St. Louis was
caused by the up-river City of Chicago. Missouri, however, could not link
specific damages to particular acts of pollution by Chicago, so no recovery
or injunctive relief was granted by the Court.
This failure to establish a link between a specific polluter's act and a
pollution injury suffered is a basic problem in the common law litigation
of interstate air pollution. Mathematical models are often used to show a
cause and effect relationship because the United States has no systematic
or consistent way of monitoring the changes that occur in the chemistry
of precipitation. Unfortunately, these models do not produce accurate results for isolating a particular source which is causing a downwind
problem.
Moreover, the Federal common law of interstate nuisance can only be
used to remedy an existing air pollution problem. It cannot be easily used
to prevent a pollution problem from occurring.
Also, the common law remedy can only be used by States to abate
the interstate nuisance. Individual citizens, even those whose property is
being damaged, cannot sue under this particular theory.
Due to this inability to give definite relief to those injured by interstate pollution, Congress decided to pass legislation to remedy the inadequacies of the common law in this area. The result was the Clean Air Act,
which became law in 1970 and which was significantly amended in 1977.
From this Federal legislation there are several other potential litigation
theories to control interstate pollution.
Before discussing these litigation theories, an overview of the Clean
Air Act is necessary. While the Act is somewhat imposing, the basic structure is relatively simple, as various speakers before me have pointed out.
In essence, the Clean Air Act requires a minimum Federal level of
control technology on all sources, as well as a pre-construction permitting
review program. The Act otherwise grants States the discretion to develop necessary additional standards in the State Implementation Plan
(SIP) process beyond the Federal technology standards, as long as the
additional provisions of the SIP allow the State to meet National Ambient Air Quality Standards and applicable Prevention of Significant Deterioration increments. This scheme obviously corrects many of the weaknesses of the common law system. First, it provides a preventive
approach, under the permitting review process, so that pollution injuries
are less likely to occur. Also, no causation between an injury and an act
need be shown because a SIP sets pollution emission levels on the basis of
the technological standards as well as standards set to meet National Ambient Air Quality Standards or applicable Prevention of Significant Deterioration increments. Furthermore, the Clean Air Act provides for citizen
suits so that individuals may sue for emission violations.
This scheme does have its own weaknesses, however, which prevent it
from adequately handling the interstate abatement problem. First, the
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SIP system will only control pollution in the downwind State; for instance, an upwind State will not need to install control equipment meeting stricter standards than the technology standards required by the
Clean Air Act. The upwind State is likely to meet National Ambient Air
Quality Standards and the applicable PSD increment, even though its
emissions interfere with National Ambient Air Quality Standards and the
attainment of PSD increments in the downwind State. Therefore, downwind States may bear an undue burden in pollution control.
This outcome is further encouraged by the fact that the upwind
States' politicians are not accountable to the citizens of the State where
the impact of interstate pollution occurs.
The minimal power accorded the Federal Government in this
scheme, as opposed to the significant discretion given to the States, leaves
the Federal Government without the ability to force a State Implementation Plan to require stricter standards than the National Ambient Air
Quality Standards, which would protect citizens of another State from
interstate pollution. In fact, present EPA regulations do not require upwind States to control their contributions to the pollution of other States,
but instead put the whole burden of control on the receptor State.
Also, this scheme really controls only the new sources, not previously
uncontrolled sources. Because estimates place the blame for the acid precipitation problem on existing sources, the existing Clean Air Act is generally ineffective. As a footnote, the EPA estimates that by the year 2000,
70 percent of the sulfur dioxide being emitted by power plants in the
United States will come from old plants that were built prior to 1970,
despite the projected doubling in the usage of coal in the United States.
Realizing that the basic Clean Air Act approach would not remedy
existing interstate pollution, Congress, while amending the Clear Air Act
in 1977, passed two provisions to deal directly with the interstate pollution problem. One change was Section 126 about which Paul Stolpman
has already spoken. I agree with him that this section is basically ineffective in dealing with the pollution problem.
The other new provision is Section l10(A)(2)(E) which directly attacks the interstate pollution problem. That provision requires that a
State Implementation Plan must prohibit any stationary source within
the State from emitting any air pollutant in amounts which will prevent
attainment or maintenance by any other State of any national, primary or
secondary ambient air quality standard; or, interfere with measurements
required to be included in the applicable implementation plans for any
other State. This provision, it seems to me, can be used to deal directly
with the interstate pollution issue. The EPA, however, has not done so.
To my knowledge, in the implementation plans which it has approved it
has not even considered the interstate impacts of the sources from one
State on the pollution problems of another State. For this reason, many
suits have been brought against the EPA to try to enforce the provisions
of Section 110(A)(2)(E). No decisions on this issue have been reported as
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yet.
One such case against the EPA occurred in West Virginia where an
SIP revision was granted to two of, I believe, that State's power plants.
The increase in emissions, as well as the existing emissions from these
plants, from what I understand, severely impact upon Pennsylvania. A
citizens' group originally brought suit in the Third Circuit. In think that
the case has been in the courts now for at least two years.
The EPA submitted to the Third Circuit that it really hadn't considered the interstate problem. It requested additional time so that it could
develop a model to justify what it did.
The Third Circuit gave the EPA that time. The EPA returned with a
proposal or mathematical model which Pennsylvania claims is totally inadequate. Pennsylvania is now challenging that model. To my knowledge
there is no decision at this point, but I suspect that a decision will be
reached within the year.
Another Section 110(A)(2)(E) case, in which I was involved, dealt
with two power plants here in Cleveland which are owned by the Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company. One plant is in Avon Lake and the
other plant is in Eastlake. The Sierra Club Legal Defense Fund and the
Environmental Defense Fund saw a trend of secret relaxations in the
country in which utilities that had previously avoided complying with the
Clean Air Act were not only polluting at already high levels, but furthermore were asking to increase their pollution levels by putting out higher
sulfur dioxide emissions.
At the time that the Sierra Club and the Environmental Defense
Fund got involved in the project, I believe there were 18 such relaxations
contemplated in the country. We recognized that Section 110(A)(2)(E)
was not going to be dealt with by the EPA. Accordingly, we attended a
hearing here in Cleveland and put on record our desire that the EPA not
ignore this provision and moved to force the Agency to consider Section
110(A)(2)(E). The EPA arrived at a decision which in essence said, "Well,
you might be right. There might be interstate pollution. So, we will
change our tall stack policy."
The EPA did significantly change its tall stack policy from what it
had been before, but it totally avoided the problem of Section
110(A)(2)(E). I don't believe it even mentioned Section 110(A)(2)(E) in
its decision. Essentially, it said that CEI could return in a year and show
that it was not causing any interstate pollution, or that its tall stacks are
justified on the basis of monitoring that was going to be done, although I
don't believe that monitoring was included. I don't know where that case
stands right now. I understand that the year is almost up and that CEI
should be submitting a new proposal. I don't really have much hope that
Section 110(A)(2)(E) will be confronted by the EPA, especially on the
basis of what Mr. Stolpman said earlier, and because I don't think that
the new administration has the political will to become involved in a controversy of this nature.
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I should add that the States of New York and Pennsylvania along
with several other Eastern States including the State of New Jersey have
also complained about the CEI/SIP relaxations, but where they are going
to go, I don't know.
In conclusion, let me just say that litigation under the common law of
nuisance and the Clean Air Act can, at best, be a holding action against
further pollution; and, at worst, much ado about nothing.
One further fact cannot be omitted. All of these litigation theories
beg the essential question raised by interstate pollution which is: once the
long-range transport of pollutants is taken into account by permitting
that of agencies and industry, how does one allocate the burden for ameliorating the problem? And, which facility should bear the burden of additional controls? I believe that only a new legislative or public policy
strategy can provide the answers to such questions.
Specifically, I feel that a regional approach needs to be taken to control certain pollutants. Pollutants such as sulfur dioxide and ozone need
to be regulated under Regional Implementation Plans (RIPS), not State
Implementation Plans (SIPS). Moreover, concerns over specific technological approaches such as scrubbing or coal washing in any RIP should
be abandoned. Instead, a loading or atmospheric tonnage limit should be
set, and all sources emitting the pollutant should be required to meet that
standard. Reductions in emissions could be accomplished by forming a
public corporation which would determine those sources for which an
emissions reduction would be at the least marginal cost, and would
finance these pollution reductions through revenues obtained by taxing
all regional sources contributing to the pollution problem.
The Clean Air Act is currently under consideration for amendment in
Congress. Now is the time to implement any legislative changes. While
the general conservative swing in the United States is toward less Federal
intervention in economic decisions, the problems of the interstate transport of pollutants is a particular problem requiring a federally imposed
solution. It is now time to act. And, I think that Congress would appreciate any of your contributions to the debate since this problem is really an
intractable problem for all of the States as well as Canada. Thank you.

